Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a followon stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The research presented here provides new evidence about how agents resolve strategic uncertainty. The research involves an experimental market through which agents acquire the right to participate in a follow-on stage of strategic interaction (a game). The results indicate that, in the particular environment examined here, agents' expectations of behaviors in the game determine prices in the market process. Agents anticipate outcomes, and they factor their expectations into their pricing decisions. Meanwhile, experimental results in other studies We thank Tim Cason and an anonymous referee for thoughtful comments and suggestions. We conducted the research with support from the National Science Foundation and the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Correspondence to: D.V. Williamson indicate that prices in selected types of market processes may permit agents to align expectations on outcomes in games. In these studies, prices often dictate outcomes rather than the reverse. How can the new results and the previous results be rationalized? Although the research presented here does not provide a definitive answer, the research goes some way toward focusing the types of questions succeeding research might explore. In particular, the whole body of experimental results suggests that agents grope for some means of coordinating behaviors on outcomes in game processes. Institutional environments provide instruments -or, perhaps, impediments -to coordination. Some instruments appear to lend themselves to decentralized dynamic processes that are consistent with such game-theoretic concepts as forward induction whereas other instruments seem more amenable to processes that can be characterized by backward induction. A question of how agents might identify and sort through institutional instruments that are suggestive of one type of dynamic process or another awaits a more general theory than is currently available.
The research presented here takes a step toward motivating a more general theory by examining the compatibility of game theoretical models with the classical model of market equilibrium. The experimental approach is "exploratory" in that it is motivated by questions of economic behavior in the context of institutions even though there is neither good theory nor a clear line of previous experiments that point to what might be expected. Yet, the experiments seem to be central to both the thrust of theory and applications of theory. Thus, we report on the outcomes of data generated in a particular institutional setting. While the models we apply are very suggestive, we leave open to speculation and further theory a more fundamental explanation of what we report.
The experimental design links a market process to a contract process. A contract is modeled as a game, and the purchase and sale of contracts (or games) is modeled as a market. The market involves the purchase and sale of rights to participate in a follow-on stage of strategic interaction (the game). Compatibility concerns how the two different processes -games and markets -interact when they exist side by side as subsystems in economic environments. The questions posed concern 1) the convergence to equilibrium in each process, 2) the joint convergence of the entire system to an equilibrium, and 3) the selection of equilibria in each process. For example, are equilibria in the two processes reinforcing, each promoting the convergence of the other process, or do behaviors in one process complicate convergence of the other process? Is the selection of an equilibrium in one process systematically linked to the selection of an equilibrium in the other? Of course, the focus on institutions produces a deeper question about which we can only speculate: what dynamic processes drive the joint convergence of equilibria in the two processes.
Exploring the compatibility of markets and games is, of course, distinct from a mechanism design exercise out of which a joint game and market process might emerge. A design exercise involves crafting purposeful mechanisms, the constituent parts of each of which perforce constitute an organic whole. As dictated by some solution concept, a design exercise would impose the compatibility
